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Biological Determinism and Symbolic Interaction: 
Hereditary Streams and Cultural Roads 
 
Robert Dingwall 
Brigitte Nerlich 
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Institute for the Study of Genetics, Biorisks and Society,  
University of Nottingham 
 
 
This paper contributes one more chapter to the long history of the intersection 
between physiological and social psychology. The impetus for this paper is a 
report by Caspi et al. published in Science (2002), one of the most prestigious 
general science journalsi, which attracted considerable media attention in the 
summer of 2002 for its claim that criminal behavior had a biological basis, arising 
from childhood experiences of maltreatment.  Although much of the subtlety of 
this paper was lost in the media portrayal of it, the widespread attention it received 
is a reminder of the fact that many people are receptive to a kind of ‘biological 
imperialism’. In response, we argue that symbolic interaction must rediscover and 
re-appropriate the engagement with biology that was a consistent theme in the 
work of Mead and his contemporaries.  By so doing, symbolic interactionists will 
be well-placed to participate fully in interdisciplinary studies. 
 
A biological basis for crime? 
The popular media tend to present behavioral genetics in what Plomin (1994) has 
called OGOD (One Gene, One Disease) terms.  This may make biological 
arguments easier to follow but it leads to serious distortions. In fact, most current 
biological accounts are much more subtle than OGOD.  Genes are now routinely 
understood by researchers to have both multiple targets and effects and to be 
regulated by their ‘environments’. The research report discussed in this paper by 
Caspi et al. (2002) is a case in point. This research was reported in the media as 
the discovery of an OGOD gene for crime.  In fact, the research was rather more 
involved.  What the paper actually claims is that childhood maltreatment interacts 
with a functional polymorphismii in the gene encoding for an enzyme called 
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monoamine oxidase A (MAOA), leading to a systematic variation in the level of 
antisocial problems caused by these individuals. 
 
The study is based on a New Zealand birth cohort of 1,037 children (52 per cent 
male) that had been tracked to age 26.  Maltreatment before the age of 11 was 
associated with antisocial problems.  However, the combination of maltreatment 
with a ‘low MAOA genotype’ increased the risk of ‘antisocial outcomes’ while 
maltreatment with a ‘high MAOA genotype’ did not.  The authors argue that this 
association may be consistent with a causal relationship between stressful 
experiences and antisocial behavior mediated by neurotransmitter development.  
So, the research reported by Caspi et al. is a combination of molecular biology and 
longitudinal data that considers the interaction MAOA types, maltreatment and 
anti-social behavior. 
 
Caspi et al.’s paper is elegantly constructed and is reasonably judicious in its 
conclusions.  However, despite its recognition of environmental factors, many 
social scientists would find it entirely unconvincing. This is because its molecular 
focus has reduced complicated and consequential social processes to an 
undifferentiated blur. When dealing with molecular biology, the subject matter of 
the natural sciences, the paper is persuasive, but this is lost as soon as the paper 
considers elements of the social world, notably ‘maltreatment’ and ‘anti-social 
behavior’. It is useful to contrast the precision of the paper’s handling of genes 
with the murkiness of its handling of social factors. Caspi et al. begin with a very 
precise definition of a relationship between a specific gene, which may occur in 
different alleles, its production of a particular enzyme and the action of this 
enzyme in the metabolization of identified neurotransmitters.iii However this 
precision deserts the team as soon as they turn to considering the alleged social 
correlates of these biological processes.  Caspi et al. see the natural science world 
very clearly and at ‘close range’.  However, the messier world studied by social 
scientists is a blur to them.  As we will argue in this paper, Caspi et al. conflate 
different objects when they try to integrate problematic elements of the social 
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world such as ‘maltreatment’ and ‘anti-social behavior’ with less problematic 
elements of the natural world, such as enzymes.   
 
The paper begins by arguing the case for an association between maltreatment and 
neurotransmitter systems, hypothesizing that maltreatment heightens 
neurotransmitter activity, with the result that any deficiency in an enzyme that 
metabolizes neurotransmitters will have an exaggerated effect in terms of 
subsequent outcomes.  However, the weakness of Caspi et al.’s argument is that 
maltreatment is defined only in terms of a loose set of proxy indicators.  These 
are: lack of parental affection and neglect, as judged by observers of parent-child 
interaction at age 3, severe physical punishment, based on self-reports by parents 
at ages 7 and 9 and self-reports by cohort members at age 26, multiple changes in 
primary caregiver and unwanted sexual contact, also based on self-reports at age 
26.  These different experiences are merged into a single cumulative exposure 
index.  64 per cent of the sample had no maltreatment by this index, 28 per cent 
had one experience, labeled as ‘probable maltreatment’ and 8 per cent had two or 
more, labeled as ‘severe maltreatment’.iv   
 
‘Maltreatment’ is, however, ultimately a label applied by an observer to a set of 
acts.  As a result, its definition has proved highly malleable, according to the 
interests of investigators (Gelles 1975; Graham et al. 1985).  The prevalence and 
incidence of maltreatment can be constructed more or less at will, according to the 
definition that is chosen (Dingwall 1989).  Although Caspi et al.’s study is 
supposed to be based on a cumulative index, there are actually only three points 
on the scale – nil, probable and severe.  This inevitably maximizes the number of 
children classified as ‘severely maltreated’.  We can illustrate this by reference to 
the definition of sexual abuse.  This includes any self-report of genital touching 
before the age of 11, as well as grosser acts of attempted or actual intercourse.  
There is no consideration of the context of the touching or whether it was actively 
undesired – all touching is assumed to be unwanted.  A single act in the common 
context of play between small children co-bathing with each other or with parents 
is sufficient to warrant labeling a cohort member as potentially abused.  This is 
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certainly a view current in child protection circles but for many researchers it is a 
marker of the prissiness of moral entrepreneurs rather than something comparable 
to the chemical signature of MAOA.   
 
Problems also arise with the equally diffuse outcome measures of ‘anti-social 
behavior’.  This set conflates judgments of adolescent conduct disorder 
(‘adolescents displaying a persistent pattern of behavior that violates the rights of 
others’); convictions for violent crimes (common assault, aggravated assault, 
domestic violence, manslaughter, rape); self-reports on an aggression scale; and 
ratings by associates.  Anti-social behavior, however, depends on what counts as 
pro-social behavior in particular cultural environments.  As we noted above, the 
Caspi et al. study appears to invoke a standard of gentility, which may reflect the 
world as the authors would like it to be but which may not have much to do with 
the world as it is outside the groves of academe.  The person who ‘does not show 
guilt after doing something bad’, for instance would have been a hero to the 
existentialist philosophers of the 1940s and 1950s.  The person who is ‘impulsive, 
rushes into things without thinking’ may have an important role on the sports field 
or in armed combat.  A soccer team, like an army, may need both thinkers and 
doers, people who will take risks without evaluating them. 
 
The current biological stance, though, is exemplified by Rowe (2002:3) who 
scoffs, in a recent introductory text on biology and crime, at ‘some social 
deconstructionists [who] say that crime is an entirely arbitrary cultural invention’ 
and goes on to assert that murder and adultery are universally prohibited.  
Unfortunately, he is simply wrong.  As the essays in Bohannan (1960) show, the 
dividing line between homicide and suicide is a variable one in many traditional 
African societies and, even in our own, there is a complex jurisprudence on the 
difference between murder, manslaughter and accidental death.  Murder may be 
universally prohibited but what constitutes ‘murder’ is entirely contingent on the 
way particular societies define the significance of deaths.  Essentially the same 
points can be made about adultery and Rowe’s other examples - stealing food and 
telling untruths. These categories are the contextual product of social processes by 
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which behaviors are defined rather than Aristotelian forms, where meanings are 
inherent in acts.  We do not know what murder is when we see it, in the way that 
biologists know what MAOA is.  There are no inscription devices (Latour and 
Woolgar 1979), merely a lengthy process of social organization that leads to a 
warrantable for all practical purposes decision that this death is a murder and that 
death is manslaughter and that other death is suicide.   The problems were 
acknowledged almost twenty years ago by a leading UK birth cohort researcher, 
discussing the problem of predicting delinquency from longitudinal data: 
What is called a crime depends in part on who the caller is.  The totality of 
acts that break the law may have no other shared description.  One cannot 
know in advance whether criminal acts (even criminal acts of a certain 
type e.g. breaking and entering) have a single set of causes.  Heterogeneity 
of crimes could mask important causal relationships. (McCord and 
Wadsworth 1985: 61) 
Conversely, homogenizing crimes may create spurious causal relationships.   
 
Caspi et al. have nothing to say about the possible consequences for their 
argument of the complex processes of decision-making that lead to the 
identification of some members of their cohort as anti-social.  If we stick only to 
those who have been incarcerated, it is the uncontested wisdom of even the most 
traditional criminologist that this population is not a representative sample of 
those who commit acts capable of being defined as criminal.  Incarceration is the 
result of a long sequence of screening decisions, beginning with the victim of a 
crime or a first responder and their decision whether or not to seek the 
intervention of the criminal justice system.  At each stage, from investigation 
through arrest, charge, trial and conviction, the population is winnowed in non-
random ways that lead to the particular pattern of variables that characterize the 
incarcerated.  It is, then, essential to distinguish between those factors associated 
with the original act and those associated with decisions to screen in or out at each 
stage of the criminal justice process.  This point was originally made in response 
to Lombroso’s (1911) criminal anthropology, which argued that a set of physical 
characteristics that led men and women to be regarded as particularly brutish and 
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threatening to respectable society were related to their acts rather than to law 
enforcers’ screening decisions.  More recently it has been raised in relation to sex 
chromosome abnormalities, which often led to distinctive physiques:  
Even if their behaviour was no more aggressive than XXY males, it might 
be that because of their great height and build they would present such a 
frightening picture that the courts and psychiatrists would be biased to 
direct them to special hospitals for community safety.  The bias might be 
further aggravated by the associated intellectual abnormality.  This factor 
might find expression in the raised incidence of XYY (and XXYY) males 
in special hospital groups. (Hunter 1966: 984).  
We might reasonably ask, then, whether the factors that lead both professional and 
lay reviewers of the behavior of these cohort members to define them as in some 
sense disturbed also lead criminal justice system personnel to process them in 
ways that increase their risk of conviction and incarceration.  It is not necessarily 
the case that they are any more or less anti-social but that they are more likely to 
be selected for high-tariff processing.  The same point can be made in respect of 
the psychiatric diagnoses, which again rest on non-random samples of the 
population of potential candidates, especially for a condition like adolescent 
personality disorder.   
 
If these acts had the same thing-like quality as MAOA, then it might be easier to 
sustain the claim for a causal association.  Unless a comparable behavioral object, 
independent of social definitions can be specified, however, the claim makes very 
little sense.  Here, the best that seems possible is that some people with low levels 
of MAOA seem to cause other people some unspecified trouble, while others with 
high levels of MAOA seem not to.   Even then, we may still need to know more 
about what ‘trouble’ means.   
 
The core of the problem lies in the philosophical realism of some biologists, a 
position that they share with most practicing scientists.  Realism does not produce 
obstinate difficulties in the everyday conduct of science.  ‘Any competent 
geneticist’ can see the existence of the polymorphism, or at least regard the 
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inference of its existence from indirect measures as unproblematic. The 
association of the polymorphism with varying levels of MAOA rests upon a chain 
of intervening processes whose activities are clearly recognized, if not always 
fully understood.  That understanding is, however, merely a matter of time as the 
process of research leads the collective knowledge of the community of scientists 
into closer correspondence with the reality that it is observing.  The sociology of 
science’s skepticism about this epistemology is almost incomprehensible to most 
working scientists.  When you hold an Eppendorf tube up to the light and see a 
tangle of DNA at the bottom, you are seeing something that seems very real and 
non-arbitrary.  Social scientists work with very different materials that make 
straightforward realist positions simply unsustainable – which is not, of course, to 
say that there have not been periodic attempts to sustain them.  The problem with 
the biological explanation of crime is that it attempts to cross from one kind of 
object to another without recognizing the need to confront the epistemological 
challenges that arise in the process.   
 
The difficulties involved have been well recognized by social scientists since the 
differentiation of biology, psychology and sociology between 1880 and 1920.  At 
the beginning of this period, Herbert Spencer could write authoritatively about all 
three.  By the end, they are institutionally distinct disciplines, with their own 
research agendas, journals and networks of support and patronage.  In the process 
of moving from the undifferentiated homogeneity of the sciences that had 
characterized scholarship from the revolution of the seventeenth century to the 
distinct heterogeneity that we recognize today, however, there was a willingness 
to engage in direct arguments that has since largely disappeared, for good 
institutional reasons (Abbott 2001).  Nevertheless, as this discussion has shown, 
the result of such barriers is that distinguished biologists can invest considerable 
time, money and creative energy in research whose methodological problems 
could be exposed by an average undergraduate.  The reasons for such investment 
are, of course, not purely intellectual ones.  The possibility of such a misallocation 
of resources arises in part, though, from each discipline’s neglect of the theoretical 
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debates that contributed to their division during the early part of the twentieth 
century.   
 
Physiological Psychology and Social Psychology 
As Dingwall (2001) has pointed out, there is a certain anachronism in referring to 
work as ‘symbolic interactionist’ before 1937, when Blumer first coined the term.  
Nevertheless, it is not entirely unjustifiable since most of the key figures had some 
association with G.H. Mead or shared with him a common experience of graduate 
study in Germany, where an emerging discipline of psychology was being cross-
fertilized by the proposals about the nature of mind and behavior emerging from 
pragmatism.  WI Thomas (1896), for example, discusses the limited progress 
made by European ‘psycho-physics’.  He rejected the attempt to ground 
psychology in biological structures, like brain weight or cranial measurement, 
while retaining a notion of drive or instinct, particularly in relation to food and 
sex.  The expression of these drives was, though, environmentally determined.   
It is a popular view that moral and cultural views and interests 
have superseded our animal instincts; but the cultural period is 
only a span in comparison with prehistoric times and the 
prehuman period of life, and it seems probable that types of 
psychic reaction were once for all developed and fixed; and 
while objects of attention and interest in different historical 
periods are different, we shall never get far away from the 
original types of stimulus and response.  It is indeed a 
condition of normal life that we should not get too far away 
from them (Thomas 1901: 751).   
This is an argument that would be quite familiar to to-day’s evolutionary 
psychologists.  For a period, there was a flurry of interest in trying to define 
human instincts as the drivers for behavior.  McDougall (1909), for example, lists 
flight, repulsion, curiosity, pugnacity, subjection, self-assertion, the parental 
instinct, reproduction, gregariousness, acquisition and construction.  Thomas, 
himself, elaborated his ‘food and sex’ instincts into his legendary ‘four wishes’ – 
recognition, response, new experience and security.   
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By 1921, Faris and Bernard were pointing to the dire confusion that had resultedv: 
How does it happen that gifted men are so unable to agree on 
what they consider the basic facts of human nature? Some 
slight differences might be understood, but surely the range is 
distressingly wide.  One [instinct] or two, or four, or eleven, or 
sixteen, or thirty, or forty – this looks suspicious. (Faris 1921: 
188) 
Some part of this resulted from loose usage: Bernard (1921: 100-101) comments 
on the tendency of social scientists to use ‘instinct’ as a vague way of talking 
about habitual action, without distinguishing this from the genuine automatism of 
an inherited action pattern triggered by a specific stimulus. Faris notes that instinct 
has most usually been explained by ‘the so-called genetic method’ (p.198).  By 
this he means a Lamarckian process, where previously advantageous behaviors 
are impressed on the human organism in an enduring fashion (see also Bernard 
1921: 108).  Two examples that he takes from a contemporary psychologist are 
the suggestion that the love of baseball reflects prehistoric man’s need to run, 
throw and strike, while the former dependence of humans on horses is shown by 
the instinct of children to ride rocking horses.  If one is talking about societal 
evolution, Lamarckianism is a more viable theory than in the case of biology: 
clearly social groups can study their competitors and seek to incorporate their 
behavior.  However, the idea that this is then somehow fixed into physical human 
structures has all the problems that Darwin and Wallace identified.  Several 
millennia of circumcision have not led to Jewish boys being born without 
foreskins.  One could respecify the theory in more Darwinian terms.  Boys who 
are successful at running, throwing and striking are advantaged in mate selection 
and reproduction, passing on skills that are then transferable to baseball.  But, as 
Faris notes, such arguments are quickly falsified by ethnology.  If we know that 
the human species has only a minor and relatively trivial degree of genetic 
variation, then either this gives rise to a high degree of uniformity of behavior or it 
has very little influence at all.  Why would the same selection process result in 
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baseball in the US, cricket in England and pelota in the Basque regions of Spain 
and France?   
 
Moreover, Faris points out, our account of the selection process is entirely 
mythical.  McDougall (1909: 282), for example, describes the ‘primitive family’ 
in terms that he borrows from the folklorist Andrew Lang:  
The primitive society was a polygamous family consisting of a patriarch, 
his wives and children.  The young males, as they became full-grown, 
were driven out of the community by the patriarch who was jealous of all 
possible rivals to his marital privileges.  They formed semi-independent 
bands hanging, perhaps, on the skirts of the family circle, from which they 
were jealously excluded.  From time to time the young males would be 
brought by their sex impulse into deadly strife with the patriarch, and, 
when one of them succeeded in overcoming him, this one would take his 
place and rule in his stead.   
No-one has ever observed such a society.  This is simply a ‘just-so’ story.  Faris 
goes on to present a very entertaining account of his six month old baby’s ‘instinct 
for toe-sucking’ in terms of its advantage in recycling food dropped on cave 
floors!  Frequently, he adds, these ‘just-so’ stories are also supported by highly 
selective examples from lower animals.  ‘Such naïve inventions based on a theory 
of evolution’, he concludes, ‘form no part of a valid scientific method’ (Faris 
1921: 193).  
 
Faris acknowledges the role of instinct in animals and possibly in respect of 
simple acts by very young children.  However, he sees no conclusive evidence 
that humans have any specific instinctive patterns.  The ‘genetic psychologist’ 
assumes that which he or she should make a hypothesis.  An instinct must be 
capable of universal expression.  Ethnology, or as we would now say social 
anthropology, consistently falsifies any such claims.  However, he does open an 
interesting possibility, namely the study of temperament. Where instinct deals 
with humans in the aggregate, temperament would deal with them on the basis of 
individual differences.  He insists that temperament is as much a hypothesis as 
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instinct but that it may be more profitable to pursue, even if only because it has 
received less investigation, at least as of 1921.  We shall return to this suggestion.   
 
Although an interest in biology continued among sociologists for a while after the 
attack by Faris and Bernard, there is no doubt that this topic went into a decline 
from which it has never fully recovered.  A good index is the historiography of 
writing about George Herbert Mead, who has probably had the most enduring 
influence of the scholars working at the boundary between philosophy, 
psychology and sociology before the First World War.  Mead himself had a 
considerable interest in the embodiment of humans.  His first book (Mead 2001), 
apparently intended for publication in 1910 but never returned to the printer, 
devotes roughly a third of its length to a discussion of the field of social 
psychology and its relationship to physiological psychology.  This remains a 
recurrent theme of the lecture course on Mind, Self and Society published by his 
students in 1934 after his death (Mead 1962).  However, Mead’s leading 
interpreters, Herbert Blumer (1969) and Anselm Strauss (1977) both discarded 
this dimension of his work.  The recent rediscovery of the body as a topic in 
sociology has rarely led back to this agenda but has, rather, been caught up with 
the postmodern turn in microsociology which treats the body as a cultural artifact 
rather than as a topic in its own right.  The core of Mead’s social psychology is his 
explication of the basis on which acts acquire meaning.   
 
Mead (1962) begins from a critique of JB Watson’s (1925) behaviorism 
and Darwin’s (1872) writing on emotions.  Both, he argues, have misconceived 
the relationship between physical states and behavior in humans by 
overgeneralizing from studies of lower animals.  Lower animals communicate in 
an automatic fashion by means of gestures and responses.  Two dogs seeking to 
establish which is dominant will run through a fixed sequence of behaviors 
culminating in the withdrawal of one or the other, through an equally predictable 
display.  Human communication is, however, selective and symbolic.  We do not 
have an undifferentiated response to environmental stimuli.  Mead refers to the 
emerging literature on the psychology of attention to support this claim.  
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(Although the nature of the text does not lend itself to citation, he would probably 
be thinking of work such as that of Bartlett, whose Remembering (1932) 
summarizes fifteen years of previous research and publication on the relationship 
between perception and recall, or Wundt’s notion of vocal gesture.)  Our 
responses to our environments are selected and organized through our ability to 
use symbols.  Unlike animal communication, symbols provide for intervening 
processes between gesture and response and for the entry of the social into these 
processes.  The most important symbols are those of language, which is a shared 
and collective experience: as Wittgenstein (1972) later emphasized, the notion of a 
private language is simply nonsensical.  Language is intersubjective or it is 
nothing.  The particular mental processes that Mead proposed may no longer 
justify much discussion.  In many ways they are as much a ‘just-so’ story as the 
better-known Freudian trinity of ego, superego and id.  However, his analysis of 
the centrality of language remains central.  Because we cannot know what is in 
another person’s mind, we can only infer this from their behavior and from the 
observation of their response to our inferences.  The meaning of our actions is not 
to be found in our intentions – which are inaccessible – but in others’ responses.   
 
The development of conversation analysis since the 1960s, with the help of 
modern recording technologies, provides an empirical demonstration of what 
Mead could only contend, namely that, at its simplest, all face-to-face interaction 
rests on a three-turn structure. I say something; you respond to it; and I can then 
use the third turn to decide whether your response is adequate and adequately-
connected to what I said first. In that turn, I can either decide to move on or 
rework (repair) my first turn and hope you will respond more satisfactorily or ask 
you to explain (account for) your failure to link your turn in second position to my 
first utterance. This is a dynamic structure: the second turn for me is the first turn 
for you so that you can examine what I do in the third turn, from my position, as a 
second turn for you – and then use your next turn as a third position to comment 
on what I have done.  
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My sequence = Your sequence 
1. My Statement   
2. Your response = 1 Your Statement 
3. My Review = 2. My Response 
  3. Your Review 
In reality, the process is often somewhat more complicated. Other parts can be 
inserted in the sequence and the third turn may be left empty if the speaker does 
not choose to use it. Nevertheless, this will make the basic point – that the 
meaning of my actions is not determined by me as their author but by the response 
of others and our subsequent negotiation.   
 
This analysis is at the heart of the social scientists’ difficulties with the idea of 
biological accounts of human behavior.  The idea of a ‘gene for violence’ 
presupposes that we know what violence is.  Violence is actually a label that 
observers apply to behavior as the outcome of their application of a set of ideas 
current in a culture and which they then respond to on the basis of that culture’s 
notions about what to do about violent acts and how those notions might assemble 
into some idea of a ‘violent person’.  The argument has been pursued more fully 
in the context of addiction and drunkenness by Lindesmith and by MacAndrew 
and Edgerton.  Lindesmith (1947) pointed out that opiate addiction required that a 
person recognize the connection between the withdrawal or unavailability of the 
substance and his or her negative physical sensations.  Where opiates were 
administered for straightforward pain relief, under the conditions of his time, that 
connection was not made and one could not say that addiction had resulted.  
Clearly, a physiologist might identify modifications to that person’s biological 
processes, which could lead to an investigation of the disruptive impact of the 
substance on their ‘normal functioning’.  However, there was no simple 
equivalence between those disruptions and the behavioral consequences of being 
recognized, by self or others, as ‘addicted’.  MacAndrew and Edgerton (1970) 
looked at the experience of introducing alcohol to the indigenous peoples of North 
America.  They show that initially their response was one of puzzlement and a 
degree of disorientation.  Alcohol consumption did not result in the acts that might 
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have been expected if there were a simple relationship between physiology and 
behavior.  These acts appeared after a period of time when Native Americans had 
been able to observe European behavior under intoxication and to formulate their 
experiences in a comparable way with comparable behavioral consequences.  
Becker (1953, 1967) used a similar approach to discuss responses to cannabis and 
to LSD, and the difference between the social experience of drugs knowingly 
consumed in a group environment and those that could be consumed unknowingly 
or in isolation.  The ingestion of pharmacologically comparable substances does 
not lead to consistent and uniform behavioral effects in the way that biological 
determinism requires.  The naïve user of drugs comes to learn what the 
experiences mean and how to act on the basis of them as a result of interaction 
with the sources of information and symbolic encoding available to them.  These 
arguments can be extended further to consider ‘normal body experiences’ more 
generally.  We learn how to be well and how to be sick (Dingwall 1976)  
 
It is important, however, not to overstate this case.  One of Mead’s important 
contributions is his insistence on the materiality of embodiment.   
All social interrelations and interactions are rooted in a certain common 
socio-physiological endowment of every individual involved in them. 
(Mead 1962: 139n) 
As Dingwall (1976) stresses, the ability to operate ‘normally’ as a member of a 
particular socio-cultural group depends upon the consistency of one’s physical 
endowments and functioning with the requirements of membership.  This is an 
important distinction from more recent constructionist arguments.  The material 
world is not explained away or treated as indefinitely pliable.  Even a post-
modernist cannot play soccer with a broken leg.   
 
 
Human Biology and the Social Sciences 
What would it take, then, to reconcile biologists interested in the contributing to 
the explanation of human behavior with the social scientists who regard 
themselves as the experts in this field?  Three elements are involved. 
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First, biologists must recognize that objects in the natural and social world are 
fundamentally different.  The realism that they take as a self-evident part of 
molecular biology cannot be sustained in sociological research.  A particular 
enzyme is tangible in a way that that, for example, a maltreatment index is not.  
Biologists, especially those working at the molecular level, therefore need a better 
understanding of environments.  The sorts of generalizations that are being made 
on the basis of biological work are species-wide but are rarely subjected to 
adequate testing in relation to the diversity of environments under which our 
species is capable of flourishing.  Those environments are not simply material, in 
the sense that an ecologist might recognize but are also cultural and symbolic.  A 
generalization about the relationship between genetic polymorphisms and 
behavior needs to be sustainable across the varying cultural frameworks that 
contribute to the understanding of that behavior.  Murder is not the same as 
ritually prescribed killing or an unknowing act of witchcraft, although all may 
involve a violent death.  As Bernard (1921: 116) observed, the distinctive 
characteristic of our species is its adaptability. 
Man is able to dispense with instinct because he has a highly complex and 
well organized social environment, and in so far as this environment is 
improved and becomes more adequately organized to meet his present and 
future needs it dispenses with his instincts in the evolutionary process of 
selection or it represses and transforms them in the progressive character 
development of the individual.  
Substitute genes for instincts and the argument retains its force.   
 
The second (related) point is that biologists need a greater degree of specificity in 
the linkage between biology and behavior.  The contrast between the precision 
with which genotypes and their physiological consequences are described and the 
looseness with which the social consequences are matched to them is striking.  We 
have noted one example in the elision between ‘unwanted touching of genitals’ 
and ‘touching of genitals’ in Caspi et al. but this is not unique.  More 
fundamentally, that paper makes a leap of inference from a set of indicators that 
 16 
suggest some people are more troublesome than others to be around in an 
Australasian context to claiming a potentially universal connection to violence.  
The latter, however, is a definition founded in local culture and applied in 
particular contexts by particular observers.  It is a property ascribed to the 
behavior rather than inherent in it.  
 
Third and finally, it is equally important for social scientists to take biology more 
seriously.  The dismissive fashion in which it has been treated since World War II 
does not do justice to the scale and subtlety of the body of work involved.  Both 
Mead and Cooley, who essentially sought to close the issue by asserting the 
parallelism of social and physiological psychology should be our guides:   
“Life, it appears, is all one great whole, a kinship, unified by a common 
descent and by common principles of existence; and our part in it will not 
be understood unless we can see, in a general way at least, how it is related 
to other parts. The stream of this life-history, whose sources are so remote 
and whose branchings so various, appear to flow in two rather distinct 
channels. Or perhaps we might better say there is a stream and a road 
running along the bank – two lines of transmission. The stream is heredity 
or animal transmission; the road is communication or social transmission. 
One flows though the germ-plasm; the other comes by way of language, 
intercourse, and education. The road is more recent than the stream: it is an 
improvement that did not exist at all in the earliest flow of animal life, but 
appears later as a vague trail alongside the stream, becomes more and 
more distinct and traveled and finally develops into an elaborate highway, 
supporting many kinds of vehicles and a traffic fully equal to that of the 
stream itself. (Cooley, 1922: 3.  See also Mead 1909)  
However, we believe that this argument has to be assessed carefully.  We think, in 
particular, that Faris’s comments on temperament are worthy of further reflection.  
It should not be a great point of contest for social scientists to accept that people’s 
biological constitutions differ in ways that may have relevance to the material 
conditions for social interactions.  If the Caspi et al.  study were read as a study of 
genetic polymorphism and temperament, it might be rather more persuasive.  
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People may well have their neurological processes constructed and organized in 
ways that have a marginal influence on the speed with which they operate, their 
internal regulation and the retention and recall of information, to name but three 
possibilities.  Put into social situations, any of these may have an impact on 
process and outcome.  However, that is unlikely to be a simple linear effect.  It 
will, at the very least, be affected by the biological material that they encounter in 
the form of other people and their temperaments, and by the symbolic resources 
shared by the participants that provide the raw material out of which each 
interprets and responds to the others’ behavior.  The modest study of temperament 
may, however, be much less exciting and fundable than the alluring prospect of a 
pharmacological fix for social deviance.   
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i
  Science was the second-ranked ‘multidisciplinary sciences’ journal in the SSCI rankings for 
2001, with an impact factor of 23.329.  By comparison, the American Sociological Review, which 
was the highest-ranked sociology journal that year, has an impact factor of 2.767.  While much of 
this difference reflects differences in the citation practices of social and natural sciences, it is a 
reasonable index of the importance of Science to its community.   
ii
   This means that the gene can be present in varying forms leading in this case, either to the 
production of normal levels of MAOA or to a failure to produce it at all.  MAOA is important in 
the breakdown of two neurotransmitters, serotonin and norepinephrine.  Other research (Brunner et 
al. 1993) has suggested that the absence of MAOA is associated with a tendency towards violent 
behavior.   
iii
  The different forms in which genes can occur are known as ‘alleles’.  In this context, 
metabolization refers to the breakdown and inactivation of the chemicals involved in transmitting 
messages within the brain once these have performed their function so that they do not accumulate.   
iv
 Most of this material is not in the published paper but less accessibly presented on a linked 
website. 
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v
  Ellsworth Faris replaced WI Thomas on the Chicago faculty in 1918, teaching social 
psychology.  Luther Bernard was awarded his PhD at Chicago in 1910 and continued a close 
association with scholars there throughout a rather itinerant career.   
